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SUNSET LEGISLATION:
SPOTLIGHTING BUREAUCRACY

Few proposals for reforming the governmental bureaucracy have been
accepted as rapidly as "sunset. " 1 Since the adoption of the Colorado
Sunset Act of 1976,2 twenty-three states have enacted sunset legislation. 3
Similar measures are being considered by most other states 4 and in
Congress. 5
Under sunset legislation, specified sets of governmental entities 6 are
terminated unless they undergo regularly scheduled legislative review and
are found to meet certain criteria. These statutes are designed as actionforcing mechanisms to overcome legislative lethargy in conducting oversight by creating' 'an incentive for periodic and comprehensive executive
and legislative evaluation of existing programs and agencies. " 7 The incen-

' The term "sunset" legislation was coined by Common Cause, a public interest lobbying
organization. It complements sunshine laws, which are designed to promote public access to
administrative proceedings. The automatic termination concept implicit in sunset statutes is
not a new one, however. Former Justice William 0. Douglas proposed the idea to Franklin
Roosevelt in the 1930's, W.DouGLAS, Go EAST, YouNG MAN 297 (1974), and Professor
Lowi advocated a "tenure of statutes act" in 1969, T.Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM 309
(1969). Professor Lowi also seems to support sunset legislation. Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1977,
at 23, col. I.
2
COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-104 (Supp. 1977).
3
ALA. CoDE tit. 41, § 20-1 (Supp. 1977); ALASKA STAT.§ 44.66.010 (Supp. 1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN.§ 5-1201 (Supp. 1977); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 24-34-104 (Supp. 1977); Reorganization of Executive Branch of State Government, 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. act 77-614, § 572, at
1543 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 11.61 (West Supp. 1977); GA. CoDE ANN.§ 84-!0lb (Supp.
1977); Hawaii S.B. 460, Common Cause, State-By-State Survey of Sunset Activity (Aug. 25,
1977); IND. CODE ANN.§ 4-26-1-1 (Burns Supp. 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 49.190 (West
Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 503 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CoDES ANN.§ 82-4601
(Supp. 1977);1977 Neb. Laws no. 257, § I, at 829 (1977); 1977 N.H. Laws ch. 436; New
Mexico Sunset Law, 1977 N.M. Laws ch. 259, § I, at 2040; 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch.
712, § I, at 475; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3901 (West Supp. 1977); 1977 Digest of Ore.
Laws ch. 842; R. I. Gen. Laws§ 42-67-1 {Supp. 1977); 1977 S. D. Sess. Laws ch. 3, § I, at 25;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-2901 (Supp. 1977); TEX. STAT. ANN.§ 5429k (Supp. 1978); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 63-55-1 (Supp. 1977); Washington Sunset Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch.
289, § I, at 861.
• For a recent synopsis, see Common Cause,. State-By-State Survey of Sunset Activity
(Aug. 25, 1977).
5
The proposed Program Evaluation Act of 1977, S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), was
unanimously recommended by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and is awaiting
action on the Senate floor. Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Program Evaluation Act
of 1977, S. REP. No. 95-326, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Apparently S. 2 has been delayed
in the Senate Rules Committee, because of the widespread view of committee chairmen that
it could "substantially increase their workload." 35 CONG.Q. WEEKLY REP. 2528 (1977); 36
CONG.Q. WEEKLY REP. 52 (1978).
6
This note uses the terms "entity'' and "activity" to denote those governmental units
subject to sunset legislation. This terminology avoids the possible confusion caused by the
applicability of sunset to regulatory agencies, administrative departments, governmental
programs, and even organizations within the legislative and judicial branches.
7
Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 ADM IN. L. REV. 511, 514
(1976).
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tive is provided by fixed cyclical dates for the termination of particular
categories of governmental activities which can be averted only by evaluation and reauthorization. Thus, legislative examination is a prerequisite
to the continued existence of the entity. 8
Sunset legislation is a reaction to mushrooming, complicated, and
largely unsupervised government. 9 State agencies are sometimes obscure
and incompetent, 10 while federal agencies are extremely large and complex.11 The situation is compounded by what Professor Jaffe has described as the arteriosclerotic process in administrative agencies 12 and by
regulatory agencies which develop disturbingly close ties with the subjects of their regulatory power. 13
Sunset laws have broad philosophical appeal. Efficient government,
one of the articulated goals of sunset legislation, is difficult to oppose.

8
There have been tentative steps toward automatic termination in the past. The Federal
Advisory Committee Act, U.S.C. app. § I (1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(c),
90 Stat. 1247 (1976), mandated an end to Presidential commissions and boards after two
years unless reinstituted. More than 700 boards and commissions have been terminated in
the last five years; because of the creation of 525 other boards in the same period, 1250
remain. Sunset Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 2 Before the Subcomm. on lntergovemmental
Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., !st Sess. 265 (1977)
(statement of Senator Glenn) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings on S. 2]. Other federal
statutes have incorporated termination dates. Thus, the Federal Energy 'Administration Act
of 1974, which established the Federal Energy Administration, specifically provided for its
termination. 15 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). Similarly the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided for
termination after ten years. 42 U .S.C. § 1973(k) (1970).
9
A January 1977 Gallup poll found that 39% of Americans believed big government to be
the "biggest threat to the country in the future," far ahead of big labor (26%) and big
business (23%). A 1976 Harris survey found that people by a 76% to 16% margin thought the
"trouble with government is that the elected officials have lost control over the bureaucrats
who really run things." 1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 308 (statement of David
Cohen).
10
The Colorado experience in examining state regulatory panels is one example. The
Court Stenographer's Board was found to be improperly restricting entry of persons into the
field, not policing the area it was supposed to regulate, and keeping inadequate records.
Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2925 Before the
Subcomm. on Inter-Governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976) (statement of Gerald Kopel, Colorado State Legislator)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings on S. 2925].
11
See 1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 131 (statement of Senator Barry Goldwater). A General Accounting Office report on the federal aid system to state and local
governments concluded that the program involved inadequate flow of information, unnecessary complexity, uncertainty as to future funding, duplication, lack of coordination, inconsistency, and general waste. See 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 526-29 (GAO
Report to the Congress: Fundamental Changes are Needed in Federal Assistance to State
and Local Governments).
12
Professor Jaffe notes:
[The arteriosclerosis theory] is a very valuable and important theory. When the evil
which gives rise to a reform has been somewhat alleviated, the initial dynamism is
dispersed. There is a newly evolved status quo. It requires an exceptional effort of
concern and attention to maintain human energies at high pitch, to keep courage
screwed to the sticking point. Only a limited number of urgent problems can enlist
this effort at any one time; the remaining problems must be handled on a routine,
stand-by basis until the status quo once more becomes intolerable.
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L.
REv. 1105, 1109 (1954).
13
See generally Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REv. 1069
(1971); Moore, Recycling the Regulatory Agencies, 32 Pue. ADMIN. REv. 291, 295 (1972).
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Liberal support, especially at the federal level, is a result of the fiscal
straitjacket of uncontrollable or previously committed spending. 14 Conservatives see sunset legislation as a way of controlling big govemment. 15
In addition, legislators view sunset statutes as self-disciplinary measures
to check more effectively the rapidly expanding power of the executive
branch.1 6
This note suggests that sunset legislation is an appropriate response to
these concerns. Section I describes the deficiencies of current methods by
which the legislature reviews activities of the executive branch. Section II
examines the provisions of sunset legislation, emphasizing the role of
evaluation criteria, and suggests that elaborate quantitative techniques
are not crucial for adequate evaluation. Evaluation criteria currently
incorporated in various sunset statutes can best be classified according to
those which apply to entity functioning and those which evaluate an
entity's purpose. These criteria are treated in sections III and IV respectively.

I.

TRADITIONAL OVERSIGHT

Sunset legislation does not expand existing legislative oversight powers.17 Such legislation instead should be viewed as a procedural reform of

14
Uncontrolled spending rose from 93 billion dollars in 1967 to 303 billion in fiscal year
1977. As a result, actual program levels and discretionary spending have been disproportionately underfunded. 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 26 (statement of Allen
Schick).
15
Senator Goldwater has stated that "the need for a sunset law is obvious. Government
spending has become too burdensome and fiscally irresponsible .... It is urgent that we try to
get a handle on the bureaucracy. We in Congress have simply not.been as responsible as we
should have been." 1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 132.
18
Congress has recently begun to assert additional influence on executive power. The
War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. V 1975), limited presidential
authority unilaterally to commit combat forces without congressional consent. The Congressional Budget and Impounding Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. V 1975),
required that a comprehensive congressional budget statement precede the appropriations
process in order to eliminate previously disorganized spending patterns and exert congressional influence in the budgetmaking process.
In his remarks opening the hearings on S. 2, Senator Muskie, a sponsor of the bill, said,
"[S]unset is a necessary follow-up to congressional budget reform which has proven itself so
well in its first years . . . . Sunset can help us take a closer look at components of that
budget-agencies and programs that are the building blocks of national priorities." /977
Hearings on S.2, supra note 8, at 2. But cf. Senator Russell Long's statement:
[The] sunset bill would eliminate the possibility of ever having a "pennanent
program" with the exception of social security and a few other trust fund programs . . . . It would result in a weakening of the powers of Congress-and in the
granting of a substantially increased measure of power to the President and to those
holding positions which are contrary to the will of a majority of the Congress.
1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra riote 8, at 263-64.
17 Oversight can be defined as the projection of legislative influence on independent and
executive administrative and regulatory entities. Oversight is constitutionally based on
congressional power to make policy and draft legislation. See generally H. READ, J.
MAC0oNALD, J. FORDHAM, & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 318-21 (3d ed.
1973). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 required each standing committee to

272

Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 11:269

existing oversight methods. 18 The hit-and-miss supervision of governmental entities characteristic of existing oversight results largely from
discretionary review and substantial legislative indifference. This discretion is an even larger factor for indirect oversight which is performed by
small subcommittees or individual legislators.

A. Direct Oversight Methods
Direct oversight methods project legislative influence over governmental entities in an overt, organizational manner. Such formal oversight
occurs at various points in the legislative process and includes appropriations, controls over personnel, investigations, the legislative veto, and
information reporting requirements.
The most significant oversight method is the appropriations process.
Since unacceptable budgetary items are either not funded or modified, the
appropriations power provides a direct check on administrative entities.
In addition, appropriations hearings provide legislators with an opportunity to raise concerns about program administration and agency management.19 The process, however, tends to be compromised "by a fundamental role conflict for some legislators who desire rationality, efficiency,
and economy in the abstract, but more expenditures and projects for their
state or district in concrete situations. " 20 Moreover, the process tends to
focus on the incremental increases requested by the agency, rather than
on the entire authorization. 21 Thus, appropriations committees rarely
"exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee. "Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Stat. 79-753 § 136. See also the following
portion of the 1974 Budget and lmpoundment Act:
The Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate
shall study on a continuing basis proposals designed to improve and facilitate
methods of congressional budgetmaking. The proposals to be studied shall include
but are not limited to, proposals for
(I) improving the information base required for determining the effectiveness of
new programs by such means as pilot testing survey research, and other experimental and analytical techniques;
(2) improving analytical and systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of existing
programs;
(3) establishing maximum and minimum time limitations for program authorization; and
(4) developing techniques of human resource accounting and other means of
providing non-economic as well as economic evaluation measures.
31 ll.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V 1975).
18
See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
19
w. MORROW, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 162-63 (1969). For thorough analyses of
the appropriations process, see generally R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS Pouncs IN CONGRESS (1966); A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS (1964).
20
W. KEEFE & M. 0GUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE
STATES 446 (2d ed. 1968).
21
In explaining this situation, Professor Wildavsky writes:
It is much easier to agree on a small addition or decrease than to compare the worth
of one program to that of all others. Conflict is reduced by an incremental approach
because the area open to dispute is reduced. Agreement comes much more readily
when the items in dispute can be treated as differences in dollars instead of as basic
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complete a thorough review of existing programs and funding levels.
Finally, the cost-conscious appropriations process is inherently unsuitable for substantive review of agency actions. 22 Committees are preoccupied with minimizing costs and have inadequate time or staff resources
to review the need for an existing program or to determine if better
alternatives exist.
Legislative influence also may be exercised through controls on administrative personnel, which include powers to confirm executive nominations and to remove officials through impeachment. 23 These powers
can be used to insure that legislative policies are carried out by the
executive branch. Personnel selection, however, tends to be a function of
political expediency rather than merit. 24 At the national level, for example, senatorial courtesy gives a senator of the President's party veto
power over federal appointments for positions in his state. In addition,
legislators are unwilling to take the extreme steps of nonconfirmation or
impeachment for all but egregious cases. 25 As a result it is hardly surprising that thorough policy reviews seldom take place.
One of the most dramatic but infrequently utilized forms of direct
legislative oversight is investigation. Investigative oversight is generally
accomplished by standing committees although special committees are
sometimes formed. 26 Expansive subpoena and contempt powers and the
ability to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution define the outer
boundaries of investigative oversight, 27 but these powers rarely need to
be used. Investigative oversight typically involves a simple request by the
standing committee to the agency and other relevant parties to make a
statement and answer questions about a particular program at a public

differences in policy; calculating budgets in monetary increments facilitates bargaining and logrolling. It becomes possible to swap an increase here for a decrease
there or for an increase elsewhere without always having to consider the ultimate
desirability of programs blatantly in competition.
Wildavsky, Toward a Radical lncrementalism: A Proposal to Aid Congress in Reform of the
Budgetary Process.in CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH OF GovERNMENT 136 (A. de Grazia
ed. 1967).
22
See T. LowI, supra note I, at 309 (1969).
23
From 1947 to 1963, the Senate refused to confirm about one percent of presidential
nominations and candidates for promotion. W. KEEFE & M. 0GUL, supra note 20, at 432 (2d
ed. 1968).
24
But see id. at 431. First, Second, and Third Class Postmasters are chosen according to
"rule of three" provisions in which the selection is made from among the top three eligible
candidates.
2
• For an account of the effort required to mobilize opposition to the nomination of G.
Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court, see R. HARRIS, DECISION (1971).
26
The legislator proposing investigation customarily is offered the chairmanship of the
special investigatory committee. This practice "may make an impartial inquiry most difficult, for it is not immediately clear that a man who stimulates an investigation is the best
person to conduct it." L. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS 313 n.22 (1973).
27
The Supreme Court ruled in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) and in United
States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1936) that Congress may investigate to obtain information to
be used in the exercise of its constitutional powers. See generally H. READ, J. MAcDoNALD, J. FORDHAM, & w. PIERCE, supra note 17, at 318-424 (3d ed. 1973).
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hearing. The threat of such a hearing may in itself produce the action or
information desired by the committee or persuade agencies to conform
the administration of other programs to the wishes of the committee. 28
Many legislators resort to public hearings only after informal proceedings
have been unsuccessful because public excoriation may have counterproductive effects on the agency under investigation. 29 Investigative
oversight is thus by nature discretionary. Its fatal flaw is that the scope
and thoroughness of review vary greatly from committee to committee.
The most controversial form of oversight is the legislative veto which
subjects administrative regulations to prior review or veto by resolution
of the legislature or, in some cases, the responsible standing committee. 30
In Congress, the legislative veto was limited originally to executive reorganization plans, but later was applied to such areas as defense, atomic
energy, and trade. 31 Various states have adopted similar measures. 32 The
legislative veto raises significant constitutional questions, however. 33 In
addition, it may weaken executive authority, relax administrative accountability by dividing responsibility between agencies and legislative
committees, over-involve individual legislators in administrative decisions, and overburden already limited legislative and administrative
staffs. 34
The legislative veto is similar to requirements that entities periodically
submit reports of their performance for legislative review. The reports
provide information, improve legislative-executive communications, and,
at least theoretically, stimulate agency self-analysis. 35 The number of
required reports has grown significantly. 36 These reports, however, may

28

Some legislators, however, prefer formal hearings because a formal record is prepared.

M. 0GUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY 161 (1976).
29

Id. at 161-62.
See generally w. GELLHORN & c. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 125-27 (6th ed. 1974);
]. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 204-48, 282-84 (1964); L.
RIESELBACH, supra note 26, at 301-03 (1973).
31
For example, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153
(1970), authorizes the President to enter into international agreements concerning exchanges
of military information and atomic energy materials. The agreements must, however, be
submitted to Congress 60 days before taking effect and are subject to change by concurrent
resolution. See J. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 206-13 (1964).
32
w. GELLHORN & c. BYSE, supra note 30, at 123-25 (6th ed. 1974).
33
See J. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 238-48, 282-84 (1964); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of
Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REv.
569 (1953); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455 (1977). Three constitutional issues are generally
cited: congressional infringement on the presidential veto power in that the Presi~ent cannot
override a legislative veto, violation of the constitutionally established legislative process by
attachment of conditions to legislation, and infringement on the separation of powers.
34
J. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 245-48 (1964).
35
M. OGUL, supra note 28, at 176 (1976).
36
At the federal level, for example, 460 reports were submitted by various agencies in
1969. H.R. Doc. No. 31, 91st. Cong., !st Sess. (1969), quoted in M. OGUL, supra note 28,
at 177.
30
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contain self-serving and somewhat misleading information and are received with indifference by legislators. 37
B. Indirect Oversight Methods
Direct review procedures do not constitute the only available oversight
mechanisms. Professional and social contacts between legislators, legislative staff, and agency personnel lead to a variety of indirect oversight
methods, including casework and support for administrative management
techniques.
Casework involves direct intervention on behalf of constituents who
have problems with administrative agencies and occupies a very large part
of legislative staff time. 38 In this ad hoc way, individual legislators and
their staffs continuously test bureaucratic responsiveness and learn about
small slices of administrative policy. Collectively these impressions and
interactions may constitute a form of oversight. Apart from its lack of
impartiality, however, casework is too result-oriented. As with the appropriations process, casework only irregularly leads to thorough analysis
of bureaucratic procedures or reexamination of the need for governmental
entities. 39
Administrative entities periodically adopt management techniques to
assist in budgetmaking and internal evaluation. These techniques may be
described as a form of oversight because legislatures often initiate or
review them. The information produced by such analysis is made available to the legislature and may be used to evaluate the efficiency and
cost-effectiveness of administrative entities. Although such previously
used management techniques as Planning, Programming Budget Systems
(PPBS) 40 and Management by Objective (MB0)41 are no longer in wide-

37
After studying several House and Senate committees, Professor Ogul reports that
congressmen and their staffs have no "systematic procedure for preserving and filing
executive reports as received." Unless staff members have a prior interest in the subject of a
report, moreover, it is in all likelihood not read. M. OGuL, supra note 28, at 177-78.
38
Id. at 162-65.
39
Professor Ogul asked forty-one congressmen, "How frequently does casework lead to
an investigation or to the introduction of legislation?" Of the twenty-six respondents,
thirteen said "seldom," four answered "from time to time," eight responded "frequently,"
and one said "usually or normally." Id. at 168-69.
0
• PPBS is a system of comparing policies which are related to a common objective for
cost and effectiveness. Once an adjustment is made in the administrative structure, many
other adjustments must be made because everything is by definition interrelated. PPBS
fared poorly in federal experiments in the 1960's. It has been criticised for increasing
bureaucratic rigidity because it furnishes a powerful incentive not to do anything. See
Hearings on Zero-Base Budget Legislation Before the Task Force on Budget Process of the
House Comm. on the Budget, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121-31 (1976) (statement of Professor
Aaron Wildavsky) [hereinafter cited as 1976 ZBB Hearings).
•• "The idea behind ... MBO 1s that objectives should be specified, and that management
and workers should agree on the results by which workers are to be judged in accordance
with these objectives." Id. at 123. This management technique has also been criticised
primarily on the grounds that the objective formulation process eventually becomes an end
instead of a means to sharpen organization performance. Id. at 123-24.
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spread use, Zero-Base Budgeting has received much recent attention. 42
All of these techniques, however, are essentially internal, executive devices and place few burdens on the legislature.
C. Defects of Traditional Oversight

The weakness of individual oversight methods does not necessarily
mean that oversight techniques are collectively inadequate. 43 The recent
surge of sunset legislation, however, indicates that traditional oversight
has not been effective. One explanation is that, with the exception of
casework, legislators see little political value in oversight activity. 44 Many
interests compete for legislators' time, and the public too often seems
satisfied that establishing an agency or commission means the problem is
solved. Moreover, policy termination is difficult to accomplish because it
implicitly admits past error, risks tough political fights with vested interests, and is not visible enough to gamer public support. "The result is a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Public policies are rarely terminated because so
few people try. Few people try because termination efforts are rarely
successful. " 45
Sunset statutes neither moot nor preempt the use of traditional oversight methods. For example, entities can still be investigated between
review cycles. Sunset legislation reorders present political realities, however, by making failure to complete oversight very visible: the entity due
for review ceases to exist and the legislature is presumably held responsible. In addition to removing the discretion of whether or not to perform
oversight, sunset legislation provides a systematic review process. This
organizing function is stressed in the preamble to the Colorado Sunset Act
of 1976:
The general assembly finds that state government actions have
produced a substantial increase in numbers of agencies, growth
of programs, and proliferation of rules and regulations and that
the whole process developed without sufficient legislative oversight, regulatory accountability, or a system of checks and bal42
Zero-Base Budgeting apparently has been successful in Georgia but not in New Mexico
or the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Initially "program elements" are evaluated by their
administrators. E3ch evaluation requires projecting the impact of funding increases, cuts,
and terminations. The result is a budget process theoretically free from the incremental
psychology that plagues current methods. See generally P. PHYRR, ZERO-BASE BUDGETING:
A PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR EVALUATING EXPENSES (1973); SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., lsT SESS., COMPENDIUM OF MATERIALS ON ZEROBASE BUDGETING IN THE STATES (Comm. Print 1977).
43
Professor Ogul concludes from his study of various congressional committees that
oversight generally is "intermittent and noncomprehensive." M. OGuL, supra note 28, at
180 (1976).
44
One study involved interviewing twenty-three Congressmen, twenty of whom indicated
"they considered committee review of agency activity a time-expensive, low-priority concern except when there was likely to be something 'big' in it." Scher, Conditions for
Legislative Control, 25 J. OF PoL. 526 (1963). For an exposition of the thesis that Congressmen's actions are functions of reelection goals, see D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
45
1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 344-45 (statement of Robert D. Behn, Institute
of Policy Sciences, Duke University).
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ances. The general assembly further finds that by establishing a
system for the termination, continuation, or reestablishment of
such agencies, it will be in a better position to evaluate the need
for the continued existence of existing and future regulatory
bodies. 46
Sunset legislation supplements the substantive elements of existing
oversight methods in only a few respects. In most sunset schemes, governmental entities must submit considerable information to evaluating
committees. 47 In addition, where Zero-Base Budgeting is used as a management technique, sunset legislation broadens the scope of evaluation.
Zero-Base Budgeting is only applicable to those governmental entities
which react to funding differentials in an elastic manner. 48 Sunset statutes, however, also apply to entities which spend little money but have
considerable economic impact. 49

II.

SUNSET LEGISLATION

The fulfillment of promises to improve oversight will depend on the
scope, procedures, and particularly the evaluation criteria of sunset statutes.
A. Description
J. Scope-The range of administrative entities affected by sunset legislation varies substantially. Some states specify by name the administrative entities that will be reviewed. 50 More frequently, however, the statutes define a broad category of entities that will be subject to evaluation,
in addition to certain specifically named activities. 51 Generally, governmental entities are divided according to whether or not they perform a
regulatory function. Limiting the scope of sunset statutes to regulatory

46

Cow. REv. STAT. § 24-34'104(1) (Supp. 1977).
Thus the Maine Sunset Act requires each entity under review to submit a justification
report to the Legislature. The report must include a description of each program, activity,
and advisory body within the entity undergoing review, complete budget statement, an
identification of other public and private "programs and activities having the same, similar
or complementary objectives," and an analysis of past and future objective accomplishment. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 504 (Supp. 1977).
48
Thus a meaningful Zero-Base Budgeting analysis requires that different funding levels
produce different levels of agency performance.
49
Some governmental bodies are likely to have roughly similar impacts over a wide range
of funding levels. For example, regulatory commissions have considerable economic impact, yet it is unclear that their impacts would be significantly affected by funding cuts. But
see Note, Zero-Base Sunset Review, 14 HARV. J. L,Erns. 505 (1978), proposing sunset
legislation which applies Zero-Base Budgeting techniques to regulatory agencies.
0
• See, e.g., TENN. CooE ANN. § 4-2903-8 (Supp. 1977).
51
See, e.g., ALA. CooE tit. 41, § 20-2(2) (Supp. 1977), which defines "agency" to
"include all departments, divisions, bureaus, commissions, councils and boards, or like
47
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commissions and licensing boards has advantages in terms of ease of
evaluation, 52 and is especially convenient for jurisdictions interested in
trying sunset on an experimental basis. 53 In addition, engaging in too
much oversight too quickly may lead to superficial, unenlightening evaluations and legislative disenchantment with systematic oversight. On the
other hand, limiting scope may effectively exclude unaffected entities
from any oversight. Moreover, states which also apply sunset to departments and administrative agencies 54 are likely to realize greater savings
because those entities consume larger portions of state budgets than do
regulatory bodies.
The proposed federal Program Evaluation Act of 1977 (S. 2) 55 excludes
regulatory commissions from the review schedule. 56 S. 2 applies to all
other federal programs except those funded through trust funds and those
which support litigation or enforce judgments involving civil rights. 57 An
attempt to include tax expenditures (deductions, credits, and exemptions)
in the review schedule was rejected in committee. 58 A unique feature of
S. 2 is that it provides flexibility to the committees to determine the scope
of review. Consequently ''what is considered as a program by one authorizing committee may be considered as several programs by another
committee, or as sub-program elements by yet another.' ' 59 S. 2 also
allows Congress to choose federal activities of particular interest for more
in-depth reviews. 60 The result is an ad hoc approach which makes optimal
use of committee staff resources and allows selection of entities which are
governmental units or subunits of the State of Alabama, regulatory in nature or otheiwise."
52 See text accompanying notes 90-95 infra.
53 Thus 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 3, § 2, at 25 simply lists eight state regulatory functions
which would terminate on June 30, 1978, absent legislative review.
54
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.66.010 (Supp. 1977).
55 S. 2, 95th Cong., !st Sess. (1977).
56 The proposed Regulatory Reform Act of 1977 (S. 600) is designed to focus on such
commissions. Sponsored by Senator Percy, S. 600 requires the President to submit reforms
regarding the various regulatory functions to Congress on a scheduled basis. The Congress
must draft its own plans if these reforms are not submitted. The Comptroller General and the
Congressional Budget Office are directed to submit reports evaluating the regulatory agencies. If no regulatory reform legislation is passed by fixed dates, the agencies are terminated
piecemeal. First, their authority to make new rules not essential for public health and safety
is removed. Second, their power to enforce nonessential rules is abolished. Third, if
legislation has not yet passed, the agencies themselves are abolished and the enforcement of
essential rules passes to the Justice Department. See Digest of Public General Bills and
Resolutions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977] CONG. RES. SERV., no. I, pt. I at A-66.
57
S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l0l(b)(4), (5) (1977).
58 S. REP. No. 95-326, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. IO (1977). Treasury Secretary Blumenthal
opposed the review of tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are difficult to define, he said,
and the fact that tax provisions are so interrelated would mean that periodic review and
change would have unforeseen results. In addition, because tax expenditures often arise
through IRS rulings rather that legislative acts, terminating them would require very detailed
legislation. 1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 107.
59 S. REP. No. 95-326, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
60 Several factors would be considered in selecting programs for review. These include:
the extent to which substantial time has passed since a program has been in effect;
the extent to which a program area appears to require significant change; the
resources of the committee with a view toward undertaking such evaluation across
a broad range of program areas; and the desirability of examining related programs
in depth in [the] same year.
S. 2, 95th Cong., lst Sess. § 302(b) (1977).
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ripe for review. Inasmuch as such flexibility could lead to relatively
cursory reviews of vast program aggregates, however, it is similar to the
inadequate discretionary oversight which sunset legislation is designed to
replace.
The scope of each sunset act should be directly related to availability of
legislative resources, particularly staff time, for use in oversight. Entity
reporting requirements in sunset statutes may not result in the provision
of full or accurate information. 61 Yet reluctance to rely on such reports,
thus putting a greater investigative burden on committee staffs, would be
prohibitively expensive. Probably the best system would include staff
spot-checking to insure submitted information was accurate. Ultimately,
evaluation costs must be balanced against the resulting savings, 62 and this
suggests that the scope of sunset statutes should be reviewed periodically .63
2. Procedures-Sunset legislation involves several important procedural questions, including the length of the review cycle, the primary
legislative evaluating body, and the rights and duties of a terminated
entity. The same considerations affecting the scope of review will also
influence its frequency. A legislature concerned about overloading itself
is likely to stretch the review cycle over a longer period. Most review
cycles run from four to six years 64 and provide little opportunity for
schedule revision. This inflexibility is designed to allow simultaneous
review of similar entities, reducing duplication of effort and evaluation
costs, and enhancing the action-forcing effect of sunset. A fixed schedule
also gives newly created agencies a breathing period to establish themselves before being required to weather legislative oversight. 65 Some
programs, such as fusion research and education grants, may not yield

Thus one critic notes:
Sunset legislation could bring into existence a defense of the status quo ....
Basically, this could happen if the operators and clients of now loosely related and
partially competitive programs found themselves forced into a more united and
forceful coalition by virtue of the now common greater threat .... Rather than
searching for ways of successfully drawing down budgets or ending programs, such
coalitions search for ways of protecting and securing their present status and
program mix. Persons are rewarded for suppressing information about program
weaknesses or vulnerabilities in such contexts.
1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 340 (statement of Robert P. Biller, Dean, School of
Public Administration, University of Southern California).
62
For an account of a General Accounting Office study of the savings resulting from some
of its program evaluations, see 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 132-54.
63 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 3, § 511 (Supp. 1977) and 1977 Neb. Laws no. 257, § 14, at 835
provide for the automatic termination of sunset legislation unless the legislature reenacts it.
64
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 49.193(C) (West Supp. 1977) (four years); Reorganization of Executive Branch of State Government, 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. act n-614, § 581,
at 1548 (five years); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 5-1201 (Supp. 1977) (six years). But see ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 3, § 506.2 (Supp. 1977) (requiring that any independent agency not specifically
covered in the Maine Sunset Act be reviewed at least every ten years).
65
1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 19-22. All enacted sunset legislation would
permit earlier-than-scheduled legislative evaluations. A fixed review schedule may prolong
the lives of entities that would have been terminated but for sunset, however, because
unscheduled activities may not be reviewed. See 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at
263 (statement of Senator Byrd).
61
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information which can be meaningfully evaluated on the review cycle.
S. 2 permits Congress some flexibility in selecting program areas within
the current review schedule for evaluation, 66 and thereby implicitly permits some flexibility in altering the review cycle. This modification,
however, compromises the action-forcing mechanism and may ultimately
be counterproductive.
Sunset statutes typically require an entity scheduled for review to be
evaluated by an intermediate body before its future is decided on the
legislative floor. The standing committee with jurisdiction over the entity
frequently conducts the initial evaluation. 67 The entity will often be required to submit reports detailing its past accomplishments, budgetary
expenditures, and future plans. 68 The committee then submits its recommendations in the form of a bill. 69 A terminated entity is allowed a six to
twelve month wrap-up period to finish pending business. 10
All statutes provide that existing legal claims against the entity not be
dismissed on grounds of termination. Some states permit the regulations
and underlying statutory authority of an entity to continue after termination. 71 Other states do not permit continuation, not only because it seems
anomalous, but also because it raises the possibility of later punishment
for failure to comply with regulations that were not being enforced at the
time of violation. 72 Reestablishment would thus require reenactment of all
authorizing legislation.
66

See note 59 supra.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 84-104b (Supp. 1977). Other states use a variety of bodies
to conduct the initial evaluation. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 505 (Supp. 1977) (state
auditor's office); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 4-2909 (Supp. 1977) (joint committees); MoNT. REv.
CoDES ANN.§ 82-4604 (Supp. 1977) (special audit committees); 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
ch. 712, § 6, at 477 (evaluation commission which includes members of the public). A
proposed New York sunset statute puts termination power into the hands of a commission
composed of legislators of both parties and public representatives. The commission's
recommendation could be overruled by either house of the legislature. Such legislation
poses serious constitutional delegation of power questions. Steingut Proposes 'Sunset' Law
to Regulate New York Agencies, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1977, at 34, col. I.
6 8 See note 46 supra.
69 The evaluating committee generally may recommend that the entity be continued, that
its structure or function be changed in some way, or that it be terminated. Committee
inaction operates as a recommendation for termination. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§5-1211 (Supp. 1977).
70
See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 20-12 (Supp. 1977) (six months); New Mexico Sunset
Law, 1977 N.M. Laws ch,. 259, § 7, at 2045 (one year).
71
Compare the Arkansas Sunset Act which provides:
In the event an agency shall cease to exist pursuant to this Act ... the laws
governing its powers, duties, and functions are not repealed, but shall be administered by some other State agency, ifso designated by the General Assembly, unless
the General Assembly specifically repealed the laws establishing such powers,
duties, and functions.
with Connecticut's Reorganization of Executive Branch of State Government, Pub. Act
77-614, § 580:
Upon the expiration of the one year period, the entity or program shall cease all
activities; all regulations promulgated by the entity or pursuant to the program shall
cease to exist, and all unexpended balances of appropriations or other funds shall
revert to the fund from which they were appropriated, or if that fund is abolished,
to the general fund.
1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1547.
72
See Government Economy and Spending Reform Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 2925
67
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3. Evaluation Criteria-All sunset statutes contain evaluation criteria
for the review of governmental entities. Some criteria apply to the way an
entity functions; others help measure the need or purpose of an activity.
Although most sunset acts include evaluation criteria applicable to function and purpose, none call attention to the significance of the distinction
even if the criteria are clearly divided. 73 Evaluation of function and
purpose are independent processes and must be clearly distinguished in
. decisionmaking. Terminating an entity because it functions poorly is
usually unjustifiable because termination should hinge on the merits of an
entity's underlying purpose. 74 Moreover, organizing an evaluation around
these two key questions simplifies both the review and drafting recommendations.
B. The Importance of Criteria
The effectiveness of sunset review will be a direct function of the
evaluation methods used. Evaluation criteria not only determine the fate
of governmental entities, but also provide an indication of legislative
commitment to oversight. For example, it will be difficult for a reviewing
committee to ignore specific statutory language calling for a determination of whether an "agency has operated in an open and accountable
manner, with public access to records and meetings and safeguards
against conflicts of interest and undue lobbying pressures. " 75 Sunset acts
not incorporating such explicit directions 76 are less likely to be effective.
Evaluation criteria thus identify specific areas of legislative concern.
They also put governmental entities on notice as to how their programs
and policies will be judged and what specific actions should be taken to
satisfy the legislative watchdog.
I. Sophisticated11 Quantitative Evaluation-Cost-benefit analysis 78
has been posed as an important method of evaluation. It is, however, of
limited usefulness as a means to judge the effectiveness of governmental
entities, primarily because it is extremely difficult to postulate 79 and
Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 47 (1976)
(question from Senator Williams' staff).
73
Only three states clearly divide on these lines, and they call no attention to the
distinction. ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 20-7, 20-8 (Supp. 1977) is confusing on this point. Section
8, which contains evaluation criteria applicable to the way entities function, is said to apply
to "whether a sufficient public need for continuance is present." Such language would seem
to be more directed at purpose. See also ALASKA STAT. § 44.66.050 (Supp. 1977) and the
Washington Sunset Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 289, § 1, at 861.
74
It is, however, possible to conceive of a situation so egregious that it would be wiser to
cut all ties with the past and establish a new governmental body.
75
1977 Neb. Laws no. 257, § IO(k), at 834.
76
For example, the Louisiana sunset legislation only contains three general evaluation
criteria. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 49.193(8) (West Supp. 1977).
77
For the purposes of this note, "sophisticated" indicates the amount of mathematical
skill required to perform the evaluation.
78
Cost-benefit analysis may be defined most simply as the comparison (usually in numerical or economic terms) of projected benefits of an activity with its anticipated costs. See
generally E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1971).
79
One commentator notes:
Identifying costs means selecting some and excluding others. Judicious selection of
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assign values to 80 the relevant costs and benefits. 81 Far from providing a
hard, neutral answer, cost-benefit analysis all too often produces results
which are functions of definitional bias and manipulation. Futhermore,
the legislature may be forced to rely on the governmental entity it is
evaluating for interpretation of the analysis. Although some evaluation
criteria require information produced by cost-benefit techniques, 821 many
others do not. 83 It is possible to accomplish much sunset oversight without the legions of calculator-toting technicians that sunset critics fear are
necessary. 84
Cost-benefit analysis is not likely to be of great value to legislators.
Legislators and their staffs generally do not possess the technical skills
necessary for meaningful evaluation of quantitative results. 85 Of greater
importance, however, is the fact that legislative decisions are ultimately
based on subjective or political judgments. Cost-benefit analysis may
provide useful information to legislators, but it will not replace considered
political decisions.
2. Evaluation Not Requiring Sophistication-Evaluation methods
which legislators can easily apply provide the most important inputs to
sunset reviews. The standard by which entities will be judged is the
crucial element in any evaluation method, since it provides legislators
with a basic framework for analysis. Two examples 86 illustrate the importance of evaluation criteria incorporated in sunset legislation, especially
where sophisticated evaluation methods are not employed.
·
In the first Alabama sunset review, the joint legislative committee
charged with initial evaluation was unable to finish formal evaluation
reports because of its enormous workload. The legislators subsequently
completed review with debate on each agency's future limited to two
hours. 87 Evaluation criteria incorporated in the Sunset Act were concertain costs, to which values are carefully assigned from within a wide range of
plausible values, can predetermine the outcome of a cost-risk-benefit analysis. Just
as arbitrary selection of certain probabilities of nuclear accident or violence, or
exclusion of the nuclear tailings risk, can make any nuclear power station appear
more attractive than a non-nuclear one, the arbitrary selection of a price elasticity
of demand, or exclusion of.some debatable or contingent category of monetary
costs, can have the same effect.
Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 911, 930
(1977).
80
Professor Mishan cites a study of realized benefits which would follow eradication of
syphilis: "more than 40 per cent of [the total $3.1 billion saving] ... was attributed to
'stigma' which was, somewhat arbitrarily, evaluated at I per cent or 0.5 per cent of earnings
subsequent to the discovery of syphilis." E. MISHAN, supra note 78, at 15.
81
See generally Symposium: Risk-Benefit Assessment in Governmental DecisionMaking, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 901 (Im); Note, The Economic Impact Disclosure Act, 10
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 566 (Im); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of /969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972).
82
See text accompanying note 113 infra.
83
See text accompanying notes 90-101 infra.
84 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-326, 95th Cong., !st Sess. 47 (1977) (supplemental views of
Senator Thomas Eagleton).
85 From 1925 to 1947, the predominant occupations of American legislators at both federal
and state levels were lawyers, businessmen, and farmers. W. KEEFE & M. OouL, supra
note 20, at 124 (1968).
86
The Alabama and Colorado examples are admittedly extreme; however, Alabama and
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sequently the only available standards by which Alabama legislators
could apply what little information they had to make decisions.
The Colorado legislature did not need sophisticated evaluation
techniques to discover the Colorado Court Stenographers Board's many
failings. A four percent stenographer qualification rate, 88 one license
revocation in fifty years, and the absence of staff, office, and most
records were important pieces of information, answering questions posed
by the Colorado Sunset Act's evaluation criteria, 89 but were acquired
without cost-benefit analysis.
III.

FUNCTION CRITERIA

A. Procedure
Evaluation criteria which focus on the procedural aspects of an entity's
performance should be directly related to the scope of the legislation. 90
These criteria are well suited to the more adversary environment of
regulatory and licensing bodies because they test the openness and fairness of the decisionmaking process. The procedures of other entities
receive less attention, not for lack of importance, but because the spending policies of these agencies are more easily examined and are more
visible to legislators.
Procedural criteria are based on the assumption that satisfactory process will lead to satisfactory decisions. 91 These criteria include the expeditious processing of formal complaints, 92 public participation in rule
and decisionmaking, 93 and whether the agency provides for adequate
feedback from regulated parties on the impacts of its actions. 94 This part
of the review can be facilitated by public hearings on the activity under
evaluation, and cost-benefit techniques are unnecessary. Some states so
provide. 95 The analogous federal practice could be to query state and
Colorado are among the few states to have actually reviewed governmental entities under a
sunset law, primarily because they were among the first to pass such legislation.
87
See Common Cause, supra note 4, at I.
88
While the legislature was investigating the Court Stenographers Board, this passing rate
shot up to 55%. See 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 63 (statement of Gerald
Kopel). This is an indication that oversight will influence agencies even if termination does
not actually occur. One Colorado legislator has reported that complaints to his office about
regulatory agencies have decreased by more than one-half since enactment of the Colorado
Sunset Act. Seib, Colorado's Prototype Sunset Law Called a Success as Several Agencies
are Killed, Merged or Moved, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1977, at 30, col. I.
89
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-104 8(b) (Supp. 1977).
90
The Reorganization of Executive Branch of State Government, 1977 Conn. Legis.
Serv. act 77-614, §§ 578, 579, at 1547, is the only sunset act which explicitly divides entities
under review into regulatory and nonregulatory groups and applies different sets of evaluation criteria to each.
91
For an argument that agency procedures provide accuracy, efficiency, and public
acceptability see Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant
Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585 (1972).
92
See Washington Sunset Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 289, § 6(5)(b), at 863.
93
See 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 3, § 6(5), at 27.
94
See 1977 Neb. Laws no. 257, § 10(2)(q), at 834.
95
See, e.g., 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 712, § 9, at 482-84, which provides detailed
instructions for giving notice of and conducting public hearings.
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local governments concerning the effectiveness and responsiveness of
those agencies which administer federal grants. 96

B. Internal Organization
Many statutes, regardless of scope, contain evaluation criteria which
measure a governmental entity's internal organization and efficiency. 97
These criteria are applicable to both administrative and regulatory bodies.
As part of this evaluation, the legislature may be required to examine
conflicts of interest among employees, 98 conformance to affirmative action hiring policies,99 reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 100 and
the quality of the activity's input to the sunset evaluation process. 101
Cost-benefit techniques are not required to answer these questions. Information on internal organization can be ascertained, for example, by
audits or reporting requirements for minority hiring and conflict of interest purposes. The difficulty of defining "efficiency," however, gives the
legislature considerable flexibility in conducting its evaluation. It is likely
to be used as a catchall criterion, reaffirming the legislative prerogative to
examine any aspect ·of an entity's operation. 102

C. Accomplishments
Governmental entity functioning may also be measured by examining
accomplishments. Criteria in this category include the achievement of
initial objectives, 103 "the extent to which statutory changes have been
recommended which would benefit the statutory entity, " 104 and compliance with underlying statutory authority . 105 Some statutes supplement
these criteria by requiring a statement of accomplishments and budgetary
expenditures .106 Since regulatory agencies perform different functions

96 See 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note IO, at 296 (statement of New Jersey State
Treasurer Leone). State and local government experience with federal funding may provide
a good source of infonnation for determining which programs are wasteful and duplicative.
Local governments would be especially willing to speak out if they were assured that those
funds would not be lost to them. Although S. 2 does not specifically provide for such a
survey, any good evaluation of a federal activity dealing with state and local governments
should require feedback from them.
97 See, e.g., 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 3, § 6(3), at 27 (1977).
9 8 See, e.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5429k, § l.10(11) (Supp. 1978).
99 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3915(5) (West Supp. 1977). Other statutes,
however, use the phrase "equal employment requirements." See 1977 Neb. Laws no. 257,
§ 10(2)(n), at 834.
10 0 See, e.g., 1977· N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 712, § 8(8), at 481.
101 See, e.g., ALA. CooE tit. 41, § 20-7(1) (Supp. 19TI).
10 • For an argument that such intense legislative oversight might duplicate and weaken the
internal discipline of the Executive Branch rather than strengthening and enforcing it, see J.
HARRIS, supra note 30, at 13.
103 See, e.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5429k, § l.l0(2)(Supp. 1978).
10 • OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 74, § 3915(1) (West Supp. 19TI).
10 • See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-1208(b) (Supp. 1977).
106
See, e.g .. S. 2, 95th Cong., !st Sess. § 303(6) (1977).
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than nonregulatory agencies, these criteria may vary with the scope of the
statute.1° 7 Accomplishment criteria for regulatory activities might include; for example, whether a licensing commission has allowed qualified
applicants to enter the field. 108
Crucial to the legislature's ability to evaluate an entity's accomplishments is a statement of entity goals and objectives. Unfortunately, the
compromising, consensual nature of the legislative process means agreement on program goals is often absent at authorization. 109 Program objectives, if stated at all, tend to be very broad.11° Consequently, a determination of failure or success is extremely difficult. The diverse perceptions of
those backing the sunset concept itself are examples of this problem. 111 In
future evaluations, their opinions of whether sunset statutes will have
been successful are likely to be quite different. On the other hand,
delineating extremely precise statutory goals is not desirable. Such goals
"offer incentives to program officials to focus on the measured goals
while neglecting other important aspects .of the program,' ' 112 and may
preclude administrators from being flexible enough to tackle obviously
related problems. Moreover, too much specificity can lead to premature
judgments that an activity was a success or failure.
More sophisticated techniques are required to assess an entity's accomplishments than its procedures or organization. Although cost-benefit
analysis sheds light on the effectiveness of an entity's operations, one
could, for example, apply the whole panoply of cost-benefit techniques
without determining whether educational support programs have been
successful. The use of accomplishment criteria is limited by the often
erroneous underlying assumption that agency goals are readily ascertainable and internally consistent. 113 As a result, relying on such goals will
107
If criteria are phrased in general terms, however, that language will look to accomplishments regardless of specific goals.
108
See, e.g., COLO, REv. STAT. § 24-34-1048(b)(O (Supp. 1977).
109
See 1976 ZBB Hearings, supra note 40, at 92 (statement of Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant
Comptroller General).
110
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), delineating the purposes of the Federal Communications Commission:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to.all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and world-wide wire and communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the
national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through
the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing a more
effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by
law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a
commission to be known as the Federal Communications Commission ....
111
See text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
112
1976 ZBB Hearings, supra note 40, at 92 (statement of Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant
Comptroller General).
113
Former budget director Roy Ash has stated:
[One major] problem is where to cut into the circle [the closed circle management
model] in an effort to improve its functioning. On many programs ... that place is
not one of an after-the-fact audit of performance but instead the achievement of a
much better statement of program objectives in the first place.
1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 16.
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lead to a somewhat subjective and impressionistic conclusion of whether
an entity has accomplished or is accomplishing its designed purposes.
Thus, it is extremely helpful that sunset statutes list criteria which,
although not providing definite answers on entity accomplishments, reveal such information as licensing rates, administrative costs, and type of
constituency served. Legislators can use such straightforwardly obtained
information for making responsible oversight decisions.
Functional evaluations which reveal incompetence or worse should not
necessarily result in the termination of the entity. Functional evaluations
answer many questions regarding the operation, accomplishments, and
costs of an entity, but they do not examine whether it serves, albeit
imperfectly, an important purpose. To the extent that the Colorado Board
of Court Stenographers was terminated for unsatisfactory licensing and
recordkeeping, for example, that action also penalized those whom the
Board was designed to protect.
Sunset statutes risk such illogical results by not distinguishing between
function and need criteria. Sunset acts ultimately could lead to termination of entities, for example, which had not complied with sunset reporting requirements. Functional criteria, however, should be viewed as a
means of improving existing bodies rather than as a basis for termination.
This distinction should be made explicit in order to minimize the danger of
arbitrary, irrational termination and to reinforce the role of automatic
termination as an incentive for the legislature rather than as a club for the
bureaucracy . 114

IV.

NEED CRITERIA

Determining the need for a governmental entity is the most difficult
evaluation problem in sunset. A rough Zero-Base Budgeting approach is
one helpful evaluation technique." 5 It involves the difficult task of projecting the impact of changes in or termination of entity funding, and
implicitly requires an initial assessment of the entity's present economic,

114

See note 128 infra.
Most states limit the zero-base approach to determining the impact of dissolution. See,
e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-2912(10) (Supp. 1977). Washington talces a broader view: the
"extent to which the absence or modification of regulation would adversely affect the public
health, safety, or welfare." Washington Sunset Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 289,
§ 7(5), at 864 (emphasis added), while Texas takes a narrow approach; "[t]he impact in terms
of federal intervention or loss offederal funds if the agency is abolished." Tux. STAT. ANN.
art. 5429k, § 1.10(13)(Supp. 1978). But see ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 20-8 (Supp. 1977); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 49.193(A) (West Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3914(1) (West
Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 42-67-6(A) (Supp. 1977). These states require the reviewing
committee to conduct an explicit zero-base evaluation. S. 2 requires "an analysis of the
services which could be provided and pe1formance which could be achieved if the program
were continued at a level less than, equal to, or greater than the existing level." S. 2, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 303(12) (1977).
115
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health, and safety impacts. 116 The inherent inaccuracies associated with
such impact statements 117 are amplified in predictions based on hypothetical funding levels. Indeed, this aspect of sunset legislation would be a
particularly good candidate for periodic review.
Several states explicitly require an evaluation of the relationship between the government's police power and the protection of the public by
regulatory agencies.U 8 Such an evaluation requires a legal background, is
subjective, and is likely to be easily reversible by a conflicting legislative
definition of "reasonableness. " 119 Another approach is to determine
whether activities with similar or conflicting missions exist and then to
eliminate any conflict or duplication. 120 Other need evaluation criteria
include assessments of alternative methods of performing the same services121 and projections of future activity operations and funding requirements.122 S. 2 goes so far as to require a proposed date by which the
activity will have fulfilled its purpose. 123
A problem associated with reviewing the need for governmental entities
is that well-established, publicly backed programs could be jeopardized
by obstinate committee chairmen, filibustering legislators, and vetohappy executives .124 Some sunset acts try to defuse these problems by
requiring public hearings and by granting the governmental entity an extra
year after termination to end its operations. 125 The public hearings could
put pressure on any antimajoritarian obstacles to reauthorization and the
termination period allows a legislative majority time to muster support to
save the entity. S. 2 neutralizes most of the procedural traps which would
lead to termination by default. 126 Its inability to circumvent the possibility
118
The Maine Sunset Act inquires: "Would the absence of regulation significantly harm
or endanger the public health, safety or welfare?" and "[d]oes the regulation have the effect
of directly or indirectly increasing the costs of any goods or services involved and if so, to
what degree?" ME. REv. STAT. tit. 3, § 505(2)(A), (D) (Supp. 1977).
117
See notes 78-79supra and Note, The Economic Impact Disclosure Act, 10 U. MICH. J.
L. REF. 566 (1977).
118 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § Il.61(4)(b) (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 3,
§ 505(2)(8) (Supp. 1977); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 82-4604 (2)(b) (Supp. 1977); 1977 Neb.
Laws no. 257, § 10(2)(b), at 833 (1977).
119
But see IF. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31-91 (1965), noting that it is very
unlikely that a court would strike down an agency as an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
120
See 1976 Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 125-30 (statement of Elmer 8. Staats,
Comptroller General). At the national level, funding duplication can be "quite complex and
time consuming requiring a comprehensive understanding of multiple Federal programs and
activities, relationships among Federal agencies, agencies' relationships with clientele
groups, and the operations of grantee organizations." Id. at 128. For example, there are 228
programs funding state health activities within the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Of these, twenty-two apply to mental health. Id.
121
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 11.61(4)(c) (West Supp. 1977).
122
See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 3, § 504 (Supp. 1977).
123
S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(11) (1977).
12
• In the latter case, for example, an activity would need two-thirds support in order to
win reauthorization.
125
See note 69 supra.
128
For example, the bill provides for liberal procedures to discharge reauthorization bills
from committees. Such committees must act prior to May 15 of the review year. If no action
has taken place, one-fifth of a quorum of the appropriate house may force its discharge.
Debate on the discharge is limited to one hour. This procedure contrasts sharply with normal
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of presidential veto may represent the price Congress pays for the
privilege of disciplining itself through sunset legislation. Since sunset
requires automatic termination, Congress must risk veto of any statute
reauthorizing a particular entity.

V.

CONCLUSION

Sunset legislation makes several contributions toward improving legislative oversight. Through its action-forcing mechanism of entity termination, legislators are confronted with their oversight duties and compelled
to review previous legislative decisions. Review schedules coordinate
oversight and help avoid duplication. Evaluation criteria supply governmental entities with legislative policy goals and provide legislators with a
framework for conducting oversight. In addition, evaluation criteria insure that legislative policy values rather than the postulates of the systems
analyst are the standards of review.
If properly carried out, sunset legislation will effect a dramatic shift in
legislative priorities by mandating continuing oversight of the executive
branch. By requiring entities to justify themselves, 127 sunset may also
create a more adversary relationship between the legislative and executive branches.
This adversary relationship may be counterproductive if bureaucratic
communities band together overtly to oppose or covertly to undermine
and deceive the review process. 128 Although sunset legislation provides

House and Senate rules which require majority votes for discharge. S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 505(d) (1977).
127
See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 20-6(b) (Supp. 1977): "All agencies shall bear the
burden of establishing that sufficient public need is present which justifies their continued
existence. All agencies shall provide the reviewing and evaluating committee with the
following information . . . . " Other states which specifically require the activity being
reviewed to justify its further existence include Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Montana
(once the legislative audit committee has recommended termination), New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Arlcansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana. The apparent
justification for imposing this burden is that it is much easier for governmental activities to
defeat attempts to abolish them than it is for them affirmatively to win reauthorization. 1976
Hearings on S. 2925, supra note 10, at 62 (statement of Colorado Legislator Gerald Kopel).
128 Thus, in this early period of sunset history, there are already signs of vested interest
opposition. For example, at the federal level, veteran's organizations are opposing any
review of Veteran's Administration programs. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note
8, at 446 (statement of Donald H. Schwab). In Colorado, court stenographers mounted a
very vigorous campaign to save their regulatory agency. In New Jersey, a proposed sunset
law has drawn fire from the president of the New Jersey State Employees Association, Ben
A. Valeri:
Under the provisions of this bill, entire state agencies could arbitrarily be wiped out
at the whim of a legislative panel ... unscrupulous officials getting power in the
state could easily use this panel to persecute particular employees or reorganize the
government to suit their own ends .... [The Sunset Act is] a veritable jaws of a bill,
a mindless job-eating machine which will paralyze the state and cause employees to
freeze with terror.
Opposition Mounts to Proposed State Sunset Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § 11, at
28-29, col. 1.
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incentives for legislative oversight, it still does not furnish positive incentives for bureaucratic conformance with legislative policy. As one observer notes, ''We must discover how program operators and clients can
be rewarded rather than punished for drawing down budgets and ending
programs." 129 Presently the incentives work the other way; if the program is discontinued, the bureaucrat is likely to be out of a job. 130
The danger of legislative indifference to oversight still remains. Evaluation and reauthorization will continue to be a mundane struggle against a
vast bureaucracy often supported by insistent parochial interests. Sunset
is only a budgetary and oversight technique. It will not bring reform by
itself. A legislature too willing to depend on staff reports and pro forma
evaluation will make little progress toward effective oversight. Few
would question that sunset is a meritorious idea worthy of "careful
thought and experiment. " 131 Translation of the idea into practical oversight will depend on much hard work in capital buildings across the
country.
-John M. Quitmeyer

129
1977 Hearings on S. 2, supra note 8, at 341 (statement of Robert P. Biller, Dean,
School of Public Administration, University of Southern California).
130
But cf. Washington Sunset Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 289, § 9(1), at 865 (1977)
(" All employees of terminated state agencies classified under ... the state civil service law,
shall be transferred as appropriate or as otherwise provided in the procedures adopted by
the personnel board."); Tux. STAT. ANN. art. 5429k, § 1.20 (Supp. 1978) (to same effect).
131
Editorial, And a Dim Dawn for Sunsets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at A24.

